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A Good Deed is Not a Crime
Moral Cosmologies of Favours in Muslim Bosnia
David Henig
On 18 August 2012 the grand mufti of the Bosnian Islamic Community,
Mustafa ef. Cerić delivered his last public sermon before he stood down after
nearly two decades in the position.1 The sermon marked the end of the holy
month of Ramadan and the beginning of the joyful bajram feast. The sermon
was later interpreted by commentators as a series of the grandmufti’s personal
reﬂections on the development of post-socialist and post-war Bosnian society,
and the moral role of Islam within it.2 It also, however, offered an interesting
perspective on the debates addressed in this book, including corruption,
informal economy, and favours, and the need to critically re-imagine analyt-
ical frameworks that dominate these debates. Themainmessage of the sermon
was to outline a positive ten-point programme for the spiritual and moral
regeneration of Bosnia-Herzegovina after the violent disintegration of socialist
Yugoslavia in the 1990s. Point four of the outlined programme is particularly
signiﬁcant for the argument I develop in this chapter. Here, the grand mufti
attacked the widespread bribery (mito) and corruption practices (korupcija) in
Bosnian society as a problem of moral responsibility and Islamic ethics,
namely as a problem between halal (lawful) and haram (unlawful), between
moral and immoral conduct.
1 The speech is available at <http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=14908:bajramska-hutba-reisu-l-uleme-1&catid=203:mina-vijesti-kat&Itemid=459>.
Accessed 4 July 2016.
2 I use the two preﬁxes ‘post’ deliberately as they play an important temporal framework in the
mufti’s argument.
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While the grand mufti was delivering his ﬁerce words, I was in a Muslim
village in the Zvijezda highlands in Central Bosnia.3 Together with half a
dozen male villagers we were sitting in the house of Zahid,4 and enjoying
sweet Bosnian coffee and gorging ourselves on baklava after a month of
fasting. We turned our attention to the television as the grand mufti moved
on in his speech to critique decaying moral values in contemporary Bosnian
society. The grand mufti then placed himself on a pedestal as the moral
guarantor of all Bosnian Muslims at home and the diaspora, and appealed
for a return to the appropriate moral values and traditions embedded in Islam
as a solution to all problems in the country. As he spoke these moralizing
words, our host Zahid pointed at the grand mufti on the screen and shouted
‘Imams and Orthodox priests are the greatest thieves’ (‘Hodže i popovi najveći
lopovi’). Then he added and gestured ‘the mufti has some in his pocket’,
referring to corrupt money. Everyone in the room burst into laughter, and
the joke earned Zahid another piece of sweet baklava from his wife, conﬁrm-
ing his reputation as a dangerous joker, and a sharp critic of Bosnian
post-war politics.
This ﬁeldwork vignette succinctly captures a common moral dilemma that
overshadows the ways in which Bosnian Muslims debate and evaluate the
economy and politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina today. On the one hand, the
vignette illustrates the zeitgeist of life in post-socialist, post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina in which issues of bribery, corruption, nepotism, unemploy-
ment, heavy indebtedness, and uneven economic development are part of
everyday reﬂections on the Bosnian state and politics. One can encounter
them during conversations everywhere, and across all categories of social
actors, in rural and urban areas alike. In the village where Zahid was living,
the level of unemployment has been consistently high for years, and six out of
ten men are without any regular job and income. For villagers like Zahid, the
post-war years have made for a daily struggle to survive as one needs to
constantly negotiate and renegotiate how to get by, have enough means to
send children to the municipal school, feed the family, and pay the high-
interest microloans that plagued the country (Jasarevic 2012). ‘You have to
live’, meaning ‘you need to get by’, is a common expression villagers fre-
quently use when reﬂecting on such struggles. For Zahid and his fellow
neighbours, ‘to get by’ has meant being involved in a number of activities
over the past two decades, ranging from working on construction sites in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and illegal timber extraction
3 Since I have carried out ﬁeldwork chieﬂy in Central Bosnia, I shall use Bosnia when referring to
my ethnographic ﬁeld sites, and Bosnia-Herzegovina when referring to the general context in
which my ethnography is situated.
4 Names and details have been changed to protect the identity of individuals.
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to illicit employment at local sawmills and bartering locally produced dairy for
various commodities with occasional traders who pass by the village. ‘You
have to live’, villagers also often added after describing how they negotiated a
deal through small illicit payments, or when asking for forgiveness after being
caught by police during illegal timber extraction.
On the other hand, the idiom ‘you have to live’ also illustrates villagers’
questioning of and reﬂections on their individual actions, and the evaluation
of such actions as framed within particular moral registers. And here themoral
dilemma emerges. Zahid as well as other villagers were all in agreement with
the grand mufti that one ought to live the moral (halal) way and avoid any
illicitness in order to be a goodMuslim. The villagers often asked how one can
be simultaneously a good Muslim and get by without losing a sense of self-
worth and dignity in the eyes of fellow consociates and the Almighty if ‘to
get by’ in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina included potentially immoral and
certainly illegal actions. When looking at ‘favours’, this moral ambiguity
in the lives of village Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes useful to our
thinking.
The outlinedmoral dilemma thus leadsme to the heart of this chapter. I will
explore the relationship between the notions of corruption, bribery, and
favours, and Muslim moral imagination and ethical conduct. Speciﬁcally,
this chapter juxtaposes and analytically distinguishes between normative
discourses on illicit economic practices and instances of doing favours in
three ethnographic contexts. These are education, mediating job access, and
the negotiation of legality and illegality with the state. The negotiation of
the line between morally (halal) acceptable conduct and immoral (haram)
conduct in the day-to-day struggle for life often requires favours or kickbacks.
This is not a morally clear-cut matter for villagers, but a matter of constant
evaluation and judgement. Hence I move my argument from the political-
economy approach that often dominates in the literature, towards the ethical
dimension of everyday life that has recently developed in anthropology
(e.g. Al-Mohammad and Peluso 2012; Laidlaw 2014). As Michael Lambek
(2010) persuasively argues, ethics is intrinsic to the human condition, actions,
and sociality rather than constituting any encompassing system of clear-cut
rules, prescripts, or beliefs (see also Laidlaw 2014). A shift in the perspective
towards the ethical dimension of ‘doing favours’ enables us to appreciate that
one cannot fully know what one means, says, or does in ongoing clariﬁca-
tions, evaluations, and judgements, as these are negotiated and renegotiated
in interactions with others through the ﬂow of life (Carrithers 2005; Keane
2014; Lambek 2010).
In the debates on what constitutes a favour, as many chapters in this book
discuss, emphasis is often placed on social exchanges, that is, how connec-
tions are established or maintained to facilitate a (illicit) service (Ledeneva
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1998; this volume). What is often neglected is an exploration of the question
of how decisions to participate in such forms of exchange are made in the ﬁrst
place. The decision of whether to ask for, or for whom one will do, a favour is
contingent rather than prescriptive, and often requires judgements over
whether to do it for that person in that situation or not. This is an inherently
ethical problem that reminds us of the moral issues inherent in what is
conventionally labelled ‘economies of favours’, and which I address in this
chapter. In so doing, I will suggest that one way of looking at the ethical
dimension in exchanges of favours is through the economy of good deeds as
understood in the context of Muslims’ moral imagination. Before I do so,
however, let me return to the grand mufti’s speech for a moment.
From Economies of Favour Towards an
Economy of Good Deeds
According to the grand mufti, the overall rebirth from the post-socialist and
post-war economic and moral decline lies in re-establishing the boundaries
between haram and halal, that is, between the immoral and moral in people’s
everyday conduct. Such an appeal is not just a kind of a theological or
moralizing discourse advocated in the public. On the contrary, I suggest that
by paying attention to the use of the moral categories of halal and haram we
can shed a different light on the debates about corruption and favours in a
post-socialist context and beyond, namely from the perspective of vernacular
moral cosmologies and how these are instantiated and negotiated in quotid-
ian ethical conduct. Indeed, the great majority of debates on illicit economic
practices and moralities under post-socialism are conventionally framed to
conform to ethnocentric models of civil society, social capital, shortage econ-
omy, and the like (Lowell 2005). Others have gloriﬁed informal economies
and favours as an autonomous sphere of action and conduct, resisting
the state. Be that as it may, such debates reproduce to a certain extent the
Cold-War ethnocentric perspective by employing the distinction ‘formal/
informal’, which reproduces the West/East divide in one way or another, as
a starting point of analysis instead of problematizing such analytical categor-
ies in the ﬁrst place (Makovicky and Henig, this volume; for a substantial
critique see Creed 2011).
In his splendid ethnography on revitalized mumming rituals in rural
Bulgaria, Gerald Creed (2011) has forged a path to move away from such a
framework. For Creed, it is the ritual action that works as a way to challenge
the dominating ethnocentric analytical perspectives on the grassroots econ-
omies and moralities after socialism. Similarly, Chris Hann (this volume) offers
a different perspective by examining the gift exchange of pálinka (homemade
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brandy) in Hungary in a longue durée framework, rather than treating it simply
as a product of the shortage economy during socialism. This chapter follows a
similar critical path. It takes seriously the notions of halal and haram as a
grassroots perspective on Muslim moral imagination underlying the spheres
of exchange and value, and how these notions are instantiated and negotiated
in everyday ethical conduct.
As I have argued elsewhere at length (Henig, n.d.), among villageMuslims in
Bosnia-Herzegovina the moral categories of haram and halal are signiﬁcant
conceptual operators in vernacular Muslim cosmologies that inform the
notions and conceptions of what it means to be a good Muslim and live a
good Muslim life. The two moral categories interconnect multiple domains of
value and exchange instantiated in a speciﬁc moral aesthetic of generosity
that I describe as halal economies. In the Central Bosnian highlands, where
I have carried out the bulk of my research, being a goodMuslim person (insan)
and living a good life requires one to enter, and be embedded in, a perpetual
cycle of ‘vital exchange’ of good deeds, merits, and prayers—for blessing,
prosperity, and fortune—between the living, the dead, and the Almighty
(see Barraud et al. 1994; Rosen 2002). Living a life that is conceived of in
terms of a ﬂow of vital exchange between the realms of the everyday and
the spiritual is considered by village Muslims as living the halal way. Thus, if
the problem of corruption and illicit practices in Bosnia-Herzegovina is framed
as a problem between halal moralities and haram immoralities and conduct,
where should we situate the debates on favours? When and for whom is the
act of doing a favour halal—morally acceptable—and when does it become
haram—immoral?
To answer these questions, I follow Caroline Humphrey’s observation (this
volume) that favours are a distinct mode of action that have moral value and
even a sacred dimension. By examining this argument ethnographically, we
can then move away from the normative, legalistic, and political-economic
views that single out favours simply as part of illicit or illegal practices, or as a
way of getting by in situations of a shortage economy and a dysfunctional
state and bureaucracy. For many villagers like Zahid, who strive and struggle
both to be a goodMuslim but also to get by under precarious conditions, being
involved in an economy of favours is ﬁrst and foremost an action that pertains
to the realm of everyday ethical conduct. It enables villagers to carve a space
for acting the halal way, and thus to maintain the ﬂow of vital exchange in
their personal eschatologies and with their consociates.
In the great majority of debates, corruption and related illicit economic prac-
tices are understood within the cost-beneﬁts, or transactional, framework—that
is, as a way of securing advantage and access for oneself or one’s own (Haller and
Shore 2005, 2). This is also a commonly accepted understanding of corruption
shared among village Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, Zahid was well
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aware of the argument that to actively corrupt someone with money to gain
personal beneﬁts, or to be corrupt, would bemorally and legally dubious, that
is, haram. On the other hand, as I shall discuss, there is an ambiguous sphere
of various forms of informal brokerage, leverage (štela in Bosnian), and con-
nections (veze in Bosnian) in which a number of villagers regularly partici-
pate, including Zahid himself. These activities and exchanges are not
necessarily understood as legally problematic, but are nonetheless conceived
of as morally dubious, and therefore potentially haram-like, thus creating
the moral dilemma outlined in the Introduction. In this chapter, I suggest
that another way of looking at this dilemma might be to look at it through
a different moral register of action, that of doing favours. The act of
doing favours, unlike actively corrupting someone, is ﬁrst and foremost
understood and evaluated by village Muslims as acting the halal way. What
is a favour then?
A favour is a type of action, Humphrey argues, that has a moral value by
virtue of not being apprehended in the transactional framework of costs-beneﬁts
and immoral gains.5 It requires non-transactional performative reciprocity
such as saying ‘thank you’ (Humphrey this volume; also Laidlaw 2000).
By drawing on Julian Pitt-Rivers’ argument on grace (2011), Humphrey invites
us to rethink favours as an act of gratuity that is incalculable, and demands
reciprocity of sentiment. Pitt-Rivers himself goes to the core of the matter
when he elegantly puts it, ‘both favors and contracts involve reciprocity, but
contractual reciprocity, the basis of trade, is not the same thing as the reci-
procity of the heart’ (2011, 427). Humphrey and Pitt-Rivers detect a distinct
potentiality in human action and the ways of forming relations, largely shared
across time, moral traditions, and regions, that complements generosity—
gratuitousness. Yet both Humphrey and Pitt-Rivers are aware of the need to
ethnographically contextualize speciﬁc forms of religious etiquette, moral
aesthetic, and social relations associated with acts of grace.
What would then be an ethnographic approximation of Humphrey and
Pitt-Rivers’ arguments on framing favour as grace and gratuitousness for
village Muslims in Bosnia? To answer this question, I shall suggest that for
villagers like Zahid, living with the moral dilemma of how to get things
done in a non-corrupt, gratuitous, and thus halal way, we need to turn our
attention to the question of everyday ethical conduct. In Central Bosnia,
village Muslims’ actions are informed and cultivated by the social etiquette
of good deeds and merits, recognized as doing sevap (from Turkish). Similarly,
Kimberly Hart (2013) in her recent work in rural Turkey, has shown
how village Muslims implement the moral category of hayir (good deeds) to
5 See also Alena Ledeneva’s work (1998, 2011).
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respond ‘to the social effects of economic change, as well as to address their
personal quests for salvation’ (2013, 74). Hart shows how village Muslims
utilize and cultivate the practice of hayir to create ‘networks of charitable
activity, [and] distributing goods’ (Hart 2013, 76) that helps the villagers to
overcome the widening socio-economic gap. The vernacular notion and prac-
tice of hayir thus refers to a form of everyday ethics of economic redistribution
and social justice that is recognized by Islamic theologians as sadaqa (sadaka in
Bosnian), that is, an act of voluntary charitable giving (Benthall 1999; Mauss
1954; Singer 2008). Hart shows that such everyday ethical conduct of doing
good deeds is instantiated in small gestures of help and assistance that do not
separate rich from poor, ‘since the poor canmake gestural contributions’ (Hart
2013, 78), or as Bosnian villagers often pointed out to me ‘sadaka is a kind
word’. This is exactly what Humphrey and Julian Pitt-Rivers have in mind
when writing about favours as the non-transactional reciprocity of sentiment:
whenever a favor has been done the return of grace is always expected, whether in
the form of a material manifestation (regardless of thematerial value of that which
is returned) or merely in verbal expression. (Pitt-Rivers 2011 [1992], 425)
Or, as Lawrence Rosen puts it in the Moroccan context, to cast the compara-
tive net more widely:
the word khayyir [Arabic equivalent of Turkish hayir], with its rich overtones of
blessedness, the good aspects of life, the gift of divine bounty, the good things
men do for and with one another . . . a circle of beneﬁcence. (Rosen 2002, 12)
These are cogent arguments for bringing the debates on favours and the
economy of good deeds into closer dialogue. Acts of good deeds, Hart
suggests (2013, 78), are the acts of small sacriﬁces which earn merit, and as
such are situated in the encompassingmoral cosmologies of vital exchange, or
circles of beneﬁcence, with the Almighty. In turn, the act of a good deed,
instantiated through generosity, self-sacriﬁce, or reciprocity of sentiment, is
by no means a self-oriented transactional act of gaining personal advantage at
the expense of others. On the contrary, it is a gratuitous act, that is, a favour.
Although village Muslims in the Central Bosnian highlands recognize the
concept of hayir, hajr, or hair, the meaning is different, leaning towards
generalized notions of ‘the good’. Instead, a good deed is known as another,
originally Turkish, word, sevap (translated in Bosnian as dobro djelo). In what
follows, I trace how the notion of good deeds (sevap) emerges as an ethno-
graphic approximation of gratuitousness or favour in Muslim Bosnia in the
three contexts, that is, education, mediating job access, and negotiation of
legality and illegality with the state. Before I do so, a further terminological
clariﬁcation is necessary to move away from the formal/informal economy
debates.
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Away from (Bosnian) Informal Economies
This chapter began with the speech of the grand mufti, and his ﬁerce critique
of corruption and bribery in post-socialist, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
word the mufti used in his speech when referring to bribery—mito—is just
one of many vernacular terms used in day-to-day encounters. The term mito
refers to direct acts of illicit payments, as does the word korupcija. There are
two other terms frequently used in Bosnian, that of štela and veze respectively.
These two terms are used in the ambiguous sphere of illicit economic practices
where mediation or leverage of access to resources are negotiated, rather than
bribery (mito) as such (for a detailed examination, see Brković 2015a, 2015b).
There are a number of similarities between these Bosnian terms and the
concept of blat discussed by Alena Ledeneva (1998, 2006) and other authors
(Lovell et al. 2000) when referring to Russia’s informal economic networks
and moralities. For Ledeneva, blat is ‘the use of personal networks and infor-
mal contacts to obtain goods and services in short supply and to ﬁnd a way
around formal procedures’, or ‘a distinctive form of social relationship or
social exchange articulating private interests and human needs against the
rigid control of the state’, and also ‘an exchange of “favours of access” in
conditions of shortage and a state system of privileges’ (1998, 1, 7, 37). Since
Ledeneva’s hallmark publication on blat, entitled Russia’s Economies of Favour,
the concept of blat has become something of an ideal type for various studies
focusing on illicit economic practices in the post-socialist context at large.6
More importantly though, the concepts of ‘informal economy’ and ‘economy
of favours’ have been used often interchangeably since then, although the two
are not alike (see Chapter 1). The reason for discussing these terminological
distinctions as a cautionarynotehere is that both štela and veze can alsobe traced
back to the times of Yugoslav socialism and it would be easy to see them simply
as a kind of favour. As with the Soviet practice of blat (Ledeneva 1998), štela,
unlike direct acts of corruption or bribery (mito), falls into a different moral
register. Štela embraces a moral view on the importance and acceptance of the
use of various personal connections to obtain goods, services, jobs, or informa-
tion in situations of shortage or impossibility of access.7 The etymology of the
term and its further contextualization deserve to be quoted at length:
[Štela] originates fromGerman stellen, whichmeans “to set up” or “connection” . . .
the word has been present in colloquial speech since the time of socialism. To say
6 Ledeneva (personal communication; also 2008), however, has been rather cautious lately in
making any direct analogies between blat and other somewhat similar practices (for a detailed
discussion on guanxi see Swancutt, Chapter 5, this volume).
7 It is important to note, however, that ‘shortage’ had a very different meaning in the socialist
Soviet and Yugoslav economies respectively.
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someone has a štela to get into university or to get a job means s/he has a connec-
tion and that the potential competition is “a set up”. It can also denote the person
who acts as a štela (for someone), i.e. a “connection”. . . .The word štela and its
derivates have a less negative connotation than the word “corruption”: they are
“softer” and more connected to private than to public discourses, although increas-
ingly common in public discourse. (UNDP Report 2009, 73)
This explication is cited here from the most authoritative text on štela to date,
that is, the 2009 United Nations Development Programme’s report, symptom-
atically called The Ties that Bind: Social Capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The
report is the product of a normative perspective on post-socialist, post-war
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and its rhetoric is not dissimilar from the trope of ‘amoral
familism’ outlined in Banﬁeld’s work The moral basis of a backward society
(1958). It bundles statistical data, qualitative focus groups, and questionnaires
rather than providing the reader with a grassroots perspective on quotidian
sociality and economic predicaments in the country. The conceptual and
methodological framework, and the overall language of the report are further
heavily inﬂuenced by Robert Putnam’sMaking Democracy Work (1993), which
was written in a similar normative vein as Banﬁeld’s study. The report is thus
yet another example of what Gerald Creed describes as ‘teleological and
ethnocentric baggage with practical political importance within global sys-
tems of power, and making an effort to redeem segments of East European
societies within that system’ (2011, 11).8 Indeed, one of the key issues men-
tioned in the report as a major obstacle to the development of democracy and
civil society, to use the language of the report, in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina
is the practice of štela, which originates, however, in the pre-war socialist past.
The practice of štela is understood in the report as a soft form of corruption,
nepotism, clientelism, or patronage. However, the key qualitative ﬁndings
of the report cannot simply be ignored. We can read them in a nutshell
as follows:
Bosnia-Herzegovina is a society dominated by strong family ties; people spend time
with and trust their immediate social networks of family, acquaintances and close
friends invariably across ethnicity, age, gender, or cantons; štela is widespread
between people and service providers, and 95% of the survey respondents answered
that štela is always or frequently useful for access to social services; 85.7% of
respondents see personal connections as the only way to get a job, and the majority
use family connections in search of employment. (UNDP Report 2009, 23)
8 Gerald Creed (2011, 113) astutely observes that an ‘informal economy’ once celebrated—by
Western politicians, commentators, and social scientists alike—as an act of resistance and
autonomy against the socialist state, has become since 1989 ‘a problem, now often redeﬁned as
“corruption” ’, and he convincingly shows how the concept of civil society ‘is offered as the
enlightened alternative’, although it was this very ‘civil society’ that enabled the ﬂourishing of
‘informal economy’ during socialism in the ﬁrst place.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST PROOF, 10/8/2016, SPi
Moral Cosmologies of Favours in Muslim Bosnia
189
Comp. by: Bendict Richard Stage : Proof ChapterID: 0002815490 Date:10/8/16
Time:13:46:56 Filepath:d:/womat-filecopy/0002815490.3D
Dictionary : OUP_UKdictionary 190
It is not my intention to question the accuracy of these ﬁndings. In fact,
the ethnographic data I have collected during my ﬁeldwork also indicates
the pervasiveness of štela in everyday life, in rural as well as urban areas
(Brković 2015a, 2015b). The case in point here, however, is the appreciation
that neither štela nor another form of favouritism are clear-cut categories.
Rather, they are morally polythetic (Humphrey and Hugh-Jones 1992, 2)
and highly contextual, emerging and reemerging from the ethical conduct
of individuals throughout the ﬂow of life. When I asked, for example, my
friend Adnan, a local activist and a DJ living in Sarajevo, about štela in 2012,
he immediately replied that ‘it has become so normal and acceptable that
people no longer think of corruption as a problem’. This comment can be
read in two ways. On the one hand, it conﬁrms the ﬁndings of the report
and its conﬂation of štela with (softer) corruption. However, on the other
hand, it illustrates, though somewhat hyperbolically, that despite its perva-
siveness, the practice of štela is not free of contextual judgements and
evaluations. In other words, not only urbanites like Adnan, but villagers
like Zahid, or high-proﬁle individuals like the grand mufti, are all aware of
the moral perils that stem from day-to-day means and struggles to get by in
post-socialist, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it is the latter that is miss-
ing in the report, which brings me back to the point made earlier in the
chapter, that there is no lack of debate among Bosnians of different walks of
life about corruption in the country. What is also often missing are peoples’
concerns as to how one can get by without losing a sense of self-worth and
dignity in the eyes of fellow consociates in the socio-economically deprived
post-war polity.
This grassroots perspective sheds light on the moral heterogeneity of what
is normatively described in the report as corruption, or ‘soft corruption’,
that is, štela. An alternative route to appreciate such moral heterogeneity
and ambiguity that I propose in this chapter is to examine how such
debates, and more importantly actions and practices, are part of everyday
ethics, enabling village Muslims to carve a space for acting the halal way in a
situation in which it seems to be almost impossible to get by without štela.
In order to do so, it is crucial to distinguish not only between corruption
(mito) and soft corruption, or informality (štela), but also between these and
the acts of doing favours and the ethics of doing good deeds. The term štela,
despite its similarities with the concept of blat, is not by deﬁnition a favour
as understood by Humphrey or Pitt-Rivers. Instead, I suggest, a štela-like act
can become a favour under certain circumstances, such as the moral
dilemma discussed in this chapter—that is, when apprehended as an act of
grace and generosity that maintains the sense of self-worth (Humphrey,
Rakowski this volume), or as a good deed that earns merit in personal
eschatology.
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Economies of Good Deeds in Muslim Bosnia
In what follows I turn towards the events and situations in which the very
notions of štela or veze are dismissed in the name of a good deed (sevap). These
moments are ambiguous and slippery (see also Humphrey, Makovicky, and
Reeves, this volume), and the potentiality of an action to be performed and
evaluated as a gratuitous favour is the case in point here. I want to discuss three
contexts which are often associated with a range of practices labelled as
corruption, illicitness, štela or veze. However, these, at the same time can
become also favours—that is, conceived of as good deeds, and thus morally
halal. Speciﬁcally, I look at the spheres of education, mediating job access, and
negotiation of legality and illegality with the state.
Mujo’s story
Let us ﬁrst consider the sphere of education. Education as a domain of nego-
tiating access through personal connections (veze/štela) or through other
means has been widely recognized in the literature on post-socialism (Hum-
phrey this volume). Access to education through personal connections is also
vividly discussed and negotiated in rural as well as urban areas across Bosnia-
Herzegovina. It includes elementary schools, as much as grammar and high
schools and universities. The latter in particular have gained attention in
a number of local media and international reports (e.g. UNDP 2009). As
I discussed with university students on a number of occasions, to pursue a
university degree is for many students more than just a matter of having good
personal connections (veze/štela). It also sometimes requires a considerable
amount of money, and one needs to calculate not only university fees, but
also additional money for ‘insuring’ success in exams and the like. All of my
interviewees with a university experience have had an experience when they
had to use, at some point, either personal connections or small amounts of
illicit payments, and often both, to get through the system. In the case of
tertiary or lower stages of education the preference has been solely given to
mobilizing, and the use of, personal networks in order to access a service (veze/
štela). An intriguing observation during my ﬁeldwork, however, was that a
number of cases of leverage or providing access were neither classiﬁed nor
understood as štela or veze. On the contrary, these events were framed and
pursued as an act of a good will, that is, as sevap. This echoes Humphrey’s and
Pitt-Rivers’ observations that for an act to be a favour it has to be recognized as
such, rather than implying a priori that there is a distinct class of acts which
are favours. Let us consider this argument further by exploring a case study
from aMuslim village in the Central Bosnian highlands that I call Brdo (Henig
2012a, 6–8), and speciﬁcally the story of Mujo.
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Mujo is simultaneously a village imam (hodža), a high-school teacher in the
municipal town, and also a neighbour, with extended agnatic networks of
relatives in the village. These three layers of social identity straddle particular
moral registers, duties, and obligations, that of Islamic moral authority, civil
servant, and kin respectively. In day-to-day situations, Mujo has to negotiate
often contradictory expectations emerging from these different strands,
and yet maintain his moral accountability, as well as self-worth to be a good
Muslim. In his everyday conduct, he places emphasis on the notion of
good deeds (sevap) as a form of everyday ethics that enable him to balance
such diverse and often contradictory expectations and obligations, and yet to
live the halal way as a good Muslim.
As a local imam and a high-school teacher Mujo’s networks of access to
inﬂuence things are dense and wide. It is no surprise that he is often
approached after prayers in the mosque, as a moral authority, or over coffee,
as kin, to solve various issues. As he often confessed to me, people approach
himwith unrealistic expectations not only of what he can do, but also of what
he is willing to do, and he makes it very explicit that he does not want to do
anything that would be considered as veze or štela. But it does not mean that
Mujo would not engage in doing favours for his fellow mosque or village
consociates at all, as the following example illustrates.
One autumn day in 2009, Mujo was approached by Nurfet, who is his
neighbour and a distant relative. In fact, Mujo was walking home through
the neighbours’ gardens and Nurfet dragged him in for a coffee as he wanted
to ask him for help, but not in public. While sitting in Nurfet’s living room it
took some time to get over the obligatory conversational themes. Only then,
Mujo was asked if he could help Nurfet’s daughter to enrol for the prestigious
subject of economic management at the municipal high school where Mujo
is a teacher. In this conversation over coffee, Nurfet tacitly implied that
the two of them are distant relatives and close neighbours (komšije), notions
that implicate mutuality, help, and compassion (Henig 2012a). Moreover,
Nurfet also carefully reminded Mujo of his socio-economic situation, that of
being the only breadwinner in the house, yet with a small and irregular
salary from the village sawmill, four kids, and massive debts. There was no
way for Nurfet to ensure that his daughter would get enrolled without any
connections and assistance, that is, veze or štela.
Mujo, as someonewho concurs with the view of the grandmufti that people
should know the moral boundaries of halal and haram in their day-to-day
conduct, was reluctant to help Nurfet in the guise of a distant relative. This
would imply to him exactly what veze/štela is. Participating in veze/štela mat-
ters is for Mujo acting the haram way. At the same time, he knew about
Nurfet’s difﬁcult situation, and was thus concerned about the well-being of
his fellowMuslim and his family in need. This matter of concern falls into the
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register of Mujo’s everyday ethics, that of acting the halal way in the ongoing
ﬂow of vital exchange with fellow consociates and the Almighty that earns
merits for doing good deeds (sevap). Mujo, therefore, eventually decided to
intervene in the selection process, and Nurfet’s daughter was enrolled
although her grades were slightly below the required average (Mujo explained
to the selection committee that her poor grades were due to her difﬁcult family
situation, rather than being just an average student). From the very beginning
Mujo did so in the name of merciful God, as an act of grace. Nurfet and his
relatives reciprocated with sentiment by thanking Mujo on many occasions,
saying ‘mayGod bless you’. Mujo’s response always was ‘halal to you’, meaning
in this context that his help was morally acceptable, and more importantly, it
was a gratuitous act, free of obligation (halal), and that Nurfet’s family does
not owe him anything. Although other villagers, as well as a number of
teachers knew about the enrolment process, none of them questioned what
Mujo did, nor invoked this case as an instance of using connections for
personal gain, as they did in the case of some other students. On the contrary,
the overall arrangement was evaluated and recognized as an act of good deeds.
Friends of God are just merciful
Another sphere I wish to discuss is the job market and how access to it is
mediated. As in the case of education, there is no signiﬁcant difference
between rural and urban areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially as Sarajevo
is the main magnet for getting a job for a vast number of villagers. Having a
job, and even more importantly having a regular income, has become a
precious resource for a great number of Bosnians of different walks of life.
The feeling shared by all my friends and interviewees was that either one
needs to have lots of money to get even a mediocre job as a shop assistant or a
security guard, or one needs to have connections with political parties.9
This was also the perception of Samir, whom I have known for many years
as someone who embraced values of non-ethnic, participatory democracy and
open civil society as the ultimate aim of post-war development in Bosnian-
Herzegovina. His understanding of these concepts was heavily inﬂuenced by a
number of workshops and projects organized by various international NGOs
after the war in which he participated. When I met Samir again in 2012,
however, he was fed up and determined to get a job through a political party
9 There is no standard price for these jobs, but for example a security guard working as a
gatekeeper for a car park for a state institution, whom I know well, paid štela of €2,500, which
was the equivalent of six months’ salary. Getting a job as a shop assistant in a grocery shop in
Sarajevo cost the family of my friend štela of €3,000 to the manager of the local branch.
A considerable number of teachers at local schools have some connections with local politicians
through whom they applied for their respective jobs, using their veze.
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in municipal elections as he has not received any salary in his current job, at
the time, for twelve months. ‘Political parties’, he told me, ‘are the only ones
who really control jobs in this country today’. Samir managed to get nomin-
ated for the SDP (Social Democratic Party), and was busymobilizing his family
and kin networks, neighbours, friends, and friends of friends across the three
constitutive Bosnian nationalities in the promise of becoming an access point
for his electorate for getting jobs or other things done, should he be elected.
There was no moral ambiguity for Samir between the embraced values of civil
society and mobilizing his networks, while promising help in the future, in
case of success. This was the way for Samir of how things get done.
The story of Samir is rather characteristic of a number of post-socialist
contexts (Kaneff this volume), as well as beyond, for political nepotism and
patronage more broadly (Boissevain 1974). Is there any space for the doing
favours beyond nepotism and patronage in accessing the job market? Can the
act of mediating access to a job be considered a moral act of favour or solely an
act of nepotism? While in the case study of education it was important who
was approached to turn such situations into an act of grace, here the who is as
important as where the debating and negotiating of the access is located. In
other words, the question is whether there is any alternativemoral space other
than the political domain, including bars, cafés or back doors, that eventually
swallowed Samir.
Here I am speciﬁcally interested in the role of dervish, or Suﬁ, sheikhs and
their lodges (tekija) in post-socialist, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina—not only
as a space of contemplation, refuge, and spiritual apprenticeship, but also as a
potentially alternative network of assistance and help that is imbued with the
moralities of care and good deeds. Speciﬁcally, what role do spaces of worship
play in situations such as mediating or arranging access to the job market?
I have written about these lodges at length elsewhere (Henig 2014), but the
lodges are also important places where the employed and unemployed,
employers and employees, meet and interact.
Among the dervish disciples, the sheikh is recognized and obeyed for his
closeness to God. The sheikh is a mediator of access between the divine world
and the world of humans, asmuch as between humans themselves. Indeed, he
is the one who cares about the hearts and souls of all of his disciples, not only
during the prayer gatherings (zikir), but all the time (through dreams for
example), outside of the life in the lodge. The sheikh’s unique qualities to
mediate between worlds and realms, and his closeness to God, make any of
his actions acts of grace, and blessing (Gilsenan 1982). In a similar vein to the
imamMujo, all sheikhs I have interviewed explained tome that it is their duty
to do so. In return, the disciples reciprocatewith sentiment, with their ultimate
love and obedience as an enactment of appropriate moral conduct (adab) that
informs their everyday ethical conduct inside as well as outside of the lodge.
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In the half a dozen lodges where I have carried out ﬁeldwork across Bosnia-
Herzegovina, I observed again and again situations such as the following. Said
is a dervish disciple in his early thirties. He worked abroad for a few years
despite a small hand impairment, and was made redundant only as a result of
the post-2008 economic crisis. Following his return to a municipal town in
Central Bosnia, he was unable to ﬁnd a job, even a temporary one, for months.
During one of the evenings in the lodge another disciple, Zakir, appeared after
twomonths of absence. Zakir works in an administrative position for the state-
run forestry company. The sheikh of the lodge took Zakir aside later during the
evening and asked him if he could hire Said as an assistant for the forest
surveyors. Zakir, without any question or comment, answered yes, and was
utterly thrilled and blessed by the sheikh’s trust in him. A few days later, Said
was already working in the position. Similarly, another sheikh in another
municipal town opened a discussion after one of the prayer gatherings, asking
one of the disciples, an assistant director in the local school, if he could make
sure that the wife of another disciple would be hired for the recently advertised
position of English language teacher. And she eventually was. Yet another
example is of a sheikh from Sarajevo who regularly instructs one of his
disciples, an owner of a medium-size building company, to hire as many
unemployed disciples as possible for seasonal jobs in summer. And the list
of such interventions, or acts of mediating access, could continue.
It would be easy to see the role of sheikhs in the process of mediating the
access to jobs simply in the same terms as in the case of Samir, that is, as a form
of nepotism and patronage whereby votes and support, or loyalty in the case
of disciples, are exchanged for prospective beneﬁts. The reciprocal logic of
politico-economic patronage is contractual. However, sheikhs offer a different
morality of exchange—that of love, mercifulness, and grace. Their mediating
role is analogous to their mediation of the divine to the hearts of their
disciples. They act in the name of God and his gratuitousness. This does not
mean that no reciprocity would be involved in such favours. However, the
moral register that we are dealing with here is what Pitt-Rivers describes when
he writes about favours, that is, ‘reciprocity of heart’ (Pitt-Rivers 2011 [1992],
427). These interventions of sheikhs, or help from other disciples, are morally
halal, and conceived of as both appropriate moral conduct and duty, and as an
act of good deed, that is reciprocated in return by prayers, love, and sentiment.
‘Sevap can’t be illegal’
In my last example I want to discuss situations in which the very notions of
legality and illegality are brought into question when re-animated as a matter
of good deeds. Speciﬁcally, I am interested in the grassroots negotiations of
villagers with the state over legality of their conduct. In the Central Bosnian
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highlands, day-to-day encounters and negotiations with the state are mani-
fold. However, there is one sphere of activity where the boundaries of
legality and illegality, and the role of štela or favours, are daily negotiated—
that of illegal/legal forest extraction, especially ﬁrewood. This has become a
prominent issue in the current situation of economic hardship and intensiﬁed
monitoring and patrolling activities of the state against illegal extraction, as
this is a precious source of income to the cantonal budgets.
In the villages, and to a large extent in a number of municipal towns,
ﬁrewood is an indispensable fuel, used for both cooking as well as heating.
Villagers often say that they have been using the surrounding forests for
extraction since time immemorial, no matter who the owner was. What is
less discussed, however, is how the extraction has been historically negotiated
with the owners. There are two categories of ownership recognized in this
context: private and state-owned. The former re-emerged in the villages only
after the disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia when some villagers success-
fully claimed their conﬁscated property back, and when some of the nouveau
riche purchased plots of forested land. The private forest is not even conceived
of by villagers as a possibility for extraction without any permission, partly
due to the fact that it would be impossible to avoid public scrutiny in the
village. The state-owned forest, however, has been exploited extensively dur-
ing and even more so after Yugoslav socialism.
After the war of the 1990s, when rural areas were devastated economically
and villagers were left unemployed, a considerable number of small village
sawmills arose across the region to exploit its rich forest resources (Henig
2012a, 6–8). This led many villagers to illegally extract timber as a way to get
by (see also Rakowski’s contribution to this volume and the parallel case of
bootleg miners). To cut a long story short, this was the case in Brdo, which
became rather infamous in the municipality as some of the villagers engaged
in illegal extraction on a massive scale. However, the consequences of such
increased illegal extraction made even the collecting of ﬁrewood, needless to
say timber, for free very difﬁcult. As I have discussed elsewhere (Henig 2012b),
this has led some particularly poor villagers to enter mined forested areas
despite the danger of unexploded ordnance (the patrol does not usually
enter these areas).
The key ﬁgure in the overall process of negotiating permission has always
been the forest patrol, who can ‘close his eyes’, or on the contrary, issue a ﬁne,
and in the case of commercial illegal extraction this can lead even to prosecu-
tion. The forest patrol is thus the key node in the network of access to illegal/
legal ﬁrewood. This position inevitably invites various attempts of bribery or
exchange of services in order to obtain permission to extract. According to
some villagers, the forest patrol were some of the richest people in the muni-
cipality during Yugoslav times, with expensive cars and spectacular houses
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due to their involvement in illicit practices. They also enjoyed this somewhat
distinguished importance during the time of my ﬁeldwork. Whenever the
patrol appeared in or around the village, those who were in the forest were
instantly warned via mobile phones. At the same time, the patrol was imme-
diately invited to one of the houses and served as special guests with coffee,
alcohol, delights, and the like, while various other villagers were passing by
the house and trying to have a word with the patrol, and thus consolidate
their relationship. Indeed, being on good terms with the patrol required the
constant cultivation of such relationships. Gifts of meat and honey were used
for bartering permission to extract timber, or for bribing the patrol during
these coffee meetings. I personally found myself in a similar situation when
my landlord, desperate to obtain permission to cut a tree, promised the patrol
that I would download and print pictures from his camera without even
consulting me on the matter. So, the emerging question is whether there is
any space for acts of favour or good deeds within these negotiations in which
it would seem nearly impossible to get by without any illicitness? To answer
this question we need to return to the argument made earlier about the ethical
side of the story about favours, and understand that the decision of to whom
one will bestow a favour is contingent rather than prescriptive, and thus
requires judgements to recognize that negotiation as a favour to that person
in that situation (see Strathern 1992).
This was the case for Mensur, a villager in his mid-thirties who was about to
build a house in one of the growing Sarajevo suburbs. He had obtained a job
there, through štela, and commuting had become inconvenient. To get timber
for the construction work on his house, Mensur asked a couple of cousins from
the village for help. They decided to get the timber from the mined areas,
ensuring Mensur would not have to arrange permission, and thus save some
extra money for other work. I joined them and helped as much as I could and
was allowed. When we ﬁnished and loaded everything on the carriage, one of
the cousins told me ‘what you did today was sevap (a good deed)’. As I joined
villagers on their adventures to the forest quite often and had never been told
that my help was considered as a good deed, I asked the cousin for further
clariﬁcation. ‘This timber’, he continued, ‘is for the house (kuća), and helping
with the house is always sevap’, a point that requires a brief explanation. As
I have argued elsewhere, in rural Bosnia the house (kuća) is one of the key
imaginative resources of vernacular cosmology of vital exchange that people
draw upon in their reﬂections on life, well-being, or relatedness (Henig 2012a,
10; see also Bringa 1995, 85–118), as well as a central nexus for accessing and
maintaining personal fortune and luck in the ﬂow of life.
In the afternoon, a while after we got back from the forest, I was with one of
the cousins when he received a phone call from a panicking Mensur. The
forest patrol found out about the timber, or rather someone had denounced
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Mensur, and was on the way to see him.Whenwe came toMensur’s house, we
found him stressed over whether he would get a ﬁne, because he did not
negotiate any ‘form’ of permission beforehand. Moreover, this time the patrol
was someone new and none of the neighbours could locate him in any known
social networks. When the patrol arrived, Mensur and his cousins apologized,
but then immediately explained that there was no commercial intention in
cutting the trees, and that he needed it for his house. One of the cousins
repeated ‘this was for the house, and helping with the house is sevap’, high-
lighting that it has nothing to do with any illicit business but with good deeds,
that is, with the very vital exchange between the living and the Almighty. The
patrol repeated that Mensur should at least have asked ﬁrst, but said that
Mensur could get a little bit more if he needed it, and that this was halal.
However, next time he needed to let the patrol know.
As this case study illustrates, there is no lack of illicitness involved in
villagers’ interactions and negotiations with the patrol to extract the forest.
On the contrary, this has long been bread and butter for numerous villagers as
one ‘has to live’ and struggle to get by. However, the question of how one can
get by without losing the sense of self-worth through being a good Muslim
remains. As the case of Mensur illustrates, there are moments and situations
that have the potentiality to become a favour, or a good deed, that go beyond
notions of legal/illegal as they are apprehended as particular ethical decisions
here and now. This brings me back to the argument that a favour is not a
distinct class of action as such, but is rather a potentiality immanent to an
action or an event, and falls into the category of ethical decisions to do a
favour to that person in that situation. Here, in the case of Mensur, the
potentiality was accentuated ﬁrstly by the notion and subsequently by the
act of recognition that ‘helping with the house is always sevap (a good deed)’,
hence granting Mensur ‘permission’ to get extra timber without invoking any
illicitness, that is, štela or veze. This recognition re-animated the situation of
negotiation with the patrol as a matter of vital exchange of good deeds for
earning merits in one’s personal eschatology, that is, in the moral register of
being halal.
Conclusion: Good Deeds as Favours
What is a favour? And what could an act of favour, as encompassed in a
Muslim moral cosmology of vital exchange and instantiated in everyday
ethics, look like? In the literature, the act of doing a favour is often described
interchangeably with notions of corruption, nepotism, or bribery. The ques-
tion thus arising from this chapter and, indeed, from the volume as a whole is,
what makes a favour a distinct act of exchange? Or is there anything distinct
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about favours at all? This chapter has sought to demonstrate the need for
differentiation between these concepts, their immoralities/moralities, their
value, and the ethical conduct these entail. If the acts of gift exchange and
reciprocity are pervasive features of human economy (Hann this volume),
then wemay want to consider a parallel social history of favours in the history
of human economy as well (for a similar approach more generally see Graeber
2001, 2011). One way to do so, as suggested in this chapter, is to follow the
path outlined by Caroline Humphrey and Julian Pitt-Rivers. As they both
persuasively illustrated, an act of favour—gratuitousness—expresses a distinct
potentiality of human action, forms of relatedness, and their ethical qualities
which are largely shared across time, moral traditions, and regions. A favour as
an act of gratuity has a moral value by virtue of not being conceived within a
transactional framework, and therefore should not be so easily lumped
together with notions of corruption, nepotism, or bribery (Humphrey this
volume). However, as Pitt-Rivers reminds us, unlike ‘pure’ or ‘free’ gifts, a
favour demands reciprocity, though a non-transactional one, including sen-
timents, affects, a prayer, and an acknowledgement of merits. Therefore, this
argument needs to be ethnographically substantiated and contextualized, as
such potentiality is often instantiated in grace events, through speciﬁc forms
of religious etiquette, forms of relatedness, moral aesthetics, and more gener-
ally in everyday ethics (Lambek 2010). With this in mind, I discussed how
such an economy of favours may be ethnographically approximated in post-
socialist, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina.
This chapter started with the speech of the Bosnian grand mufti and his
use of halal and haram categories of moral imagination and ethical conduct
in his critique of corruption and illicit economic practices. I suggested that
we take the grand mufti’s argument seriously for two reasons. Firstly, it offers
a way to shed a different light on debates about corruption and favours, that
is, from the perspective of Muslim moral cosmology as it is instantiated
and negotiated in Muslims’ everyday ethical actions and practices. Indeed,
I showed that day-to-day life is, for many villagers, a struggle and a constant
balancing between the realms of ‘getting by’ under the conditions of precar-
ious post-socialist and post-war development and at the same being a good
Muslim, that is, acting the halal way. To straddle this divide, in a non-
corrupted, gratuitous, and thus halal way, is informed by the etiquette of
good deeds and merits (sevap), as I illustrated with three ethnographic case
studies. The notion of good deeds (sevap) emerges here as an ethnographic
instance of gratuitousness or favour. In turn, I argued, Bosnian Muslims’
engagement in the economy of good deeds needs to be understood in the
wider cosmology of life apprehended as an ongoing ﬂow of vital exchange
between the living, the dead and the Almighty that earns merits in one’s
personal eschatology.
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Secondly, the perspective proposed by the grandmufti offers a distinct way
of thinking about the issues of illicit economic practices, predominantly
described as a realm of informal economy, corruption, and the like.
I argued, following Gerald Creed’s work (2011), that the latter arguments
continue to reproduce ethnocentric Cold War analytical categories, and also
policies (e.g. UNDP Report 2009). By re-animating the debates on illicit
economies as a matter of halal and haram—that is, from the perspective of
a Muslim moral cosmology—the grand mufti’s speech provides us with
yet another conceptual toolkit to re-imagine the dominant ethnocentric
analytical concepts and arguments on grassroots economies, moralities,
and the notions of value after socialism. And this brings us back to the
need to appreciate the distinct moralities and ethical conduct between nor-
mative concepts such as corruption, nepotism, and bribery, and favours,
here described as an act of good deed.
To conclude let us return to the Muslim villager Zahid, who criticized the
grand mufti so vigorously at the beginning of this chapter. When Zahid
denounced the highest BosnianMuslim religious authority for being involved
in illicit economic conduct, everyone in the room nodded, although we all
knew that Zahid, like other fellow neighbours and friends sitting around the
table, had been involved in various trickeries and štela practices as well. We
also knew, however, that unlike the grand mufti who has been receiving
redovna plaća (regular income), Zahid and his family have been without any
regular income for a decade. Yet he, like many of his Bosnian fellows, needed
to somehow get by, he ‘had to live’, without losing his sense of being a good
Muslim. The speech, however, implied to Zahid, that what he was doing to
feed his family made him less worthy as a Muslim than people like the grand
mufti. Of course he was aware of the need to live the halalway for his personal
eschatology and he struggled every day to do so. And being involved in the
economy of good deeds was a way for villagers like Zahid to balance such
moral ambiguities. Indeed, when I asked him about the ambiguity of his
earlier critical judgements against the grand mufti as being corrupted during
one of his many illicit negotiations with the forest patrol, he immediately
replied without any hesitation, ‘a good deed is not a crime’ (‘sevap nije zlocˇin’).
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